信息不对称条件下企业跨国并购的动因探析(2)
2017-11-10 04:01
导读：［参考文献］ ［1］Clarke，R.，1983a.Collusion and incentive for information sharing. Bell Journal of Economics 14，383-394. ［2］Clarke，R.，1983b.Duopolists do not wish to share inform
［参考文献］
［1］Clarke，R.，1983a.Collusion and incentive for information sharing. Bell Journal of Economics 14，383-394.
［2］Clarke，R.，1983b.Duopolists do not wish to share information，Economics letters 11，33-36.
［3］Novshek，W.，Sonnenschein，H.，1982. Fulfilled expectations Cournot duopoly with information acquisition and release. Bell Journal of Economics 13，214- 218.
［4］Vives，X.，1984. Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand. Journal of Economic Theory 34，71-94.
［5］Kirby.A，Trade association as information exchange mechanism. Rand Journal of Economics 19,138-146.
［6］田祖海，毛传阳.外资并购、非对称性政府规制与市场竞争行为［J］.中国软科学，2005，（2）.
［7］【美】杰弗瑞·A·杰里，菲利普·J·瑞尼.高级微观经济理论［M］.王根蓓译.上海:
上海财经大学出版社，2004.
