在艺术和巫术之间的宪法解释(5)

2013-04-24 18:44
导读:【注释】 [1]Steven Cooper, Judicial Creativity, Unenumberated Rights, and the Rule of Law, 1 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev.1994,p.169. [2]Ralph Tyler, Reaching the Limits of Traditional Scholarship, 80 Nw.

  【注释】

  [1]Steven Cooper, Judicial Creativity, Unenumberated Rights, and the Rule of Law, 1 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev.1994,p.169.

  [2]Ralph Tyler, Reaching the Limits of Traditional Scholarship, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1986, pp.1128-9.

  [3]Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986, pp.279-289.

  [4]波斯纳也注意到了这一现象,他曾讥诮“爱泼斯坦的理论要求废除新政,阿克曼和桑斯坦的理论能使新政合宪化,米歇尔曼的理论将使民主党的政纲宪法化,图什内特的理论则会使宪法成为一份社会主义宪章,伊利的理论会再次带来沃伦式改革,还有一些理论则会将宪法塑造成托马斯主义的新自然法”。Richard Posner, Legal Reasoning from the Top Down and from the Bottom Up : The Question of Un-enumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 Chicago University Law Review, 1992, p445.

  [5]Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the Constitution, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1996,p.48.

  [6]Steven Cooper, Judicial Creativity, Unenumberated Rights, and the Rule of Law, 1 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev.,1994, p.169.

  [7]MichaelH.v.Gerald D.,109 S. Ct.,p.2344, n.6.

  [8]Wiliam J. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 19 University of California at Davis Law Review,1985,pp.2,4.

  [9]却伯和多尔夫举的例子,是哈兰大法官在Poe v. Ullman案中的内推和外推(interpolation and extrapolation)思维:从《权利法案》明确保护的一组特殊权利中,以高度的抽象方法推断出一些统一的原则,这些原则有时关注那些作为手段而必需的权利,有时则关注那些在逻辑上已预设了的权利。这些原则构成了系争权利的确认标准(中译本108页)。不过在法解释理论中,这个方法只是一种老生常谈,即所谓的“正当性追溯”或“论辩升级”( justificatory ascend):法官通常是从具体个案出发向上思维,然后再从上位原则—诸如平等、自由或功利—出发向下思维。德沃金和波斯纳对这种方法有过细致的探讨和争论,Cf. Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 Ariz. St, L. J, 1997,pp. 357. Richard Posner, Conceptions of Legal‘Theory':A Response to Ronald Dworkin, 29 Ariz. St, L. J, 1997,pp.

  [10]Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008,p.45.

  [11]Christopher Wolf,The Result-Oriented Adjudicator's Guide to Constitutional Law,70 Tex. L. Rev. April, 1992, pp.1353.

  [12]却伯和多尔夫的立场,可以解释为何他们一贯敌视原旨主义的宪法解释进路。原旨主义奉行的克制主义政策,会产生抑制最高法院行使司法审查权的效果。在却伯和多尔夫看来,这会严重缩减法院在保护个体权利方面的角色任务。在批驳斯卡利亚大法官诉诸于历史传统的概括方法时,却伯和多尔夫还提到了第三个论据,即原意解释会导致法院在捍卫个体权利上的司法失职;是司法虚无主义(judicial nihilism)的表现。不过,这个论据明显超越了解释方法的范畴,并且本身也是成问题的。却伯和多尔夫似乎理所当然地认为,司法审查是一种界定宪法模糊语句之含义的权力,以及依据这些界定废黜法条的权力。这种界定缺乏宪法文本的支持,从制宪者意图研究中也找不到依据。却伯和多尔夫仅有的论证是:制宪者明白这不是一个完美的世界,因而无论喜欢与否,法官必须直接面对这一任务—如何抽象地界定我们所拥有的自由权。(中译本156)然而,没有证据表明制宪者考虑到了这种审查权限,更没有证据表明制宪者将其分配给了法官。Cf. Christopher Wolf, The Result-Oriented Adjudicator's Guide to Constitutional Law, 70 Tex. L. Rev. April,1992,pp.1355.

  [13]却伯在最近的一本新著中,明确主张在美国宪法的文本之外,另有一部“看不见的”宪法。后者告诉人们什么样的文本可以作为合众国宪法的一部分,以及可以赋予这些文本多大的强制力。没有文本之外的那些前提、离开了那部“看不见的”宪法,就无法理解宪法文本的意义。See Laurence H. Tribe, The Invisible Constitution, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp.7.

  [14]波斯纳亦注意到了却伯的这个缺陷,在评论《宪法性选择》时,他指出却伯只批评那些他认为是“保守的”判决,并且在选择讨论案例时存有偏见。只要“政治上正确”,却伯就会原谅判决的技术缺陷。See Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as Mirror: Tribe's Consti-tutional Choice, 84 Mich. L. Rev.,1986,p.555.

  [15]Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as Mirror: Tribe's Constitutional Choice, 84 Mich. L. Rev.,1986, p.554.

  [16]Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the Law, New York: Simon and Schuster Inc.,1991,p.199.

  [17]Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008, p.269.

  [18]Prohibitions del Roy(1607),12 Co. Rep. 63. cited from Neil MacCormick, The Artificial Reason and Judgement of Law, ed. in LegalReasoning vol.1,by Aulis Aarnio and D. Neil MacCormick, Aldershot: Dartmouth Com. Ltd.,1992, p.168.

  [19]K.N.Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: The Classic Lectures on the Law and Law School, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.116.

  [20]Martin P. Golding, A Note on Discovery and Justification in Science and Law, ed in Legal Reasoning, vol. 1,by Aulis Aarnio and D. NeilMacCormick, Aldershot: DartmouthPublishing Com. Ltd. 1992, p.122-3.

  [21]G. Gilmore, The Ages of American Law, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977,pp.23-40.

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