可别等成了“戈多”——关于中国“后现代主义(5)
2016-12-20 01:04
导读：[7] Richard A. Posner, ed. The Essential Holmes, Selections from the Letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and Other Writingsof Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., University of Chicago Press, 1992. [8] 转引自
[7] Richard A. Posner, ed. The Essential Holmes, Selections from the Letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and Other Writingsof Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., University of Chicago Press, 1992.
[8] 转引自，Gerald Gunther, Learnd Hand, The Man and the Judge, Harvard University Press, 1994, p.xiii。
[9] David Kairys ed., The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, Pantheon Books, 1982; 又请参看，Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, Harvard University Press, 1990, pp.153ff.
[10] 在《理想国》中，色拉西马克就曾说：“假如一个人推理正确，他就会同意，正义〖dikaion〗无论在何处都一样，都是强者〖kreittonos〗的利益或好处〖sumpheron〗。” Platonis Opera, vol.4，p. 339a （Ioannes Burnet ed., 1902） （Politeia, Bk I, 11. 2-4），转引自，Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, p.9 n. 12。
[11] 可参看，冯象：“法律与文学（代序）”，《木腿正义》，,
中山大学出版社，1999年。
[12] James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination: Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought and Expression, Little, Brown, and Company, 1973.
[13] Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature, A Misunderstood Relationship, Harvard University Press, 1988; Law and Literature, 2nd and enlarged ed., Harvard University Press, 1998.
[14] “Ronald Coase and Methodology”, in Overcoming Law, Harvard University Press, 1995, pp. 406ff。应当留意，这种工具主义的经济学反基础论（或基础论？）为不少经济学家所分享。请看，周其仁：“研究真实世界的经济学”，《中国季刊》，1999年。
[15] Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, Philosophical Papers vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, 1991; and Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
（科教论文网 lw.nSeAc.com编辑发布） [16] Stanley Fish, Trouble with Principle, Harvard University Press, 1999; and Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Community, Harvard University Press, 1980。应当留意，这两本书是两本文集，讨论的也并不仅仅是，甚至主要不是法律题目。
[17] John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” and “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, in John Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. By Samuel Freeman, Harvard University Press, 1999, p.306, 393－394.
[18] Overcoming Law, p.317.
[19] The Problematics of Legal and Moral Theory, Harvard University Press, 1999, pp.265-280.
[20] Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements, Law and Jurisprudence at Century’s End, New York University Press, 1995, 页208以下。敏达的判定主要基于波斯纳主张“一种没有基础的法”（《法理学题目》），这是一种反基础主义的态度，与罗蒂的反基础主义（《之镜》）有明显的血缘关系。但是敏达的断言过于简单，假如否认基础就足以构成后主义，那么科斯由于他反对学中理性人的假说，也足以称之为后现代主义者了。
[21] 维特根斯坦：《》，汤潮、范光棣译，三联书店，1992年，页45。
[22] Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence, p.55。
[23] Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. (1905), Holmes, J., dissenting, in The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes, His Speeches, Essays, Letters and Judicial Opinion, sel. and ed. by Max Lerner, The Modern Library, 1943, p. 149. 又请看霍姆斯的另一名言，“人的主要目的就是提出一些一般性命题，而——我要说——这些命题都狗屁不值（worth a damn）”。见，同上，p.444。
