经验主义、实在论和因果知识(14)
2015-06-16 01:07
导读：18、Nelson Goodman (1977), Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), p. 67. 19、ibid., p. 87. 20、参阅 Richard Boyd (1991), "Observation, Explanatory Power and Simplicity:
18、Nelson Goodman (1977), Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), p. 67.
19、ibid., p. 87.
20、参阅 Richard Boyd (1991), "Observation, Explanatory Power and Simplicity: Toward a Non-Humean Account", in Boyd, etal., (eds.), The Philosophy of Science (Cambridge: The MIT Press), 349-377。
21、Nancy Cartwright (1983), How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 85.
22、参阅Ian Hacking (1983), Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 尤其是第十三章。
23、参阅Paul Churchland (1989), "Conceptual Progress and Word-World Relations: In Search of the Essence of Natural Kinds", in Churchland (1989), A Neurocomputational Perspective (Cambridge: The MIT Press), 281-295。
24、同上引﹐p. 140。对于知觉可塑性论点的详细讨论﹐看Paul Churchland (1979), Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)。
25、Ian Hacking (1983), op.cit., p.275.
26、这篇文章的英文文本是我在1995年12月作的一门课程的期末论文。感谢
北京大学哲学系的孙永平先生校读了这个中文翻译。虽然我对相关问题的思考和我的兴趣的焦点已经发生了变化﹐我仍把本文留在它原来的形式上。
